Assassinations, American Indians, Van Halen, and More! My 17 Favorite Books of 2017

I spent the first week of 2018 sick. The next thing I knew, we were halfway through January! So, a little later than I had meant to post it, here's my annual list of "best books." I'd love to hear about what you read last year. So please leave a note about some of your 2017 books, and why you liked them, or didn't.

U.S. Presidents

1. Destiny of the Republic: A Tale of Madness, Medicine,and the Murder of a President, by Candice Millard (2011). A well-written, easy-reading book about President James A. Garfield, his assassin, and the political world they lived in. From the bibliography, it's clear that Millard knows much more about Garfield's religious life, and how it made him the great man he was. But for some reason, she neglects this vital theme. Why?

2. The Kennedy Assassination--24 Hours After: Lyndon B. Johnson's Pivotal First Day as President, by Steven M. Gillon (2009). Take the TV series "24" and make it about the first day after the Kennedy assassination. That's what Gillon does in this interesting, detailed book. Gillon provides plenty of insight for those who want to understand Kennedy, Johnson, their politics, and their presidencies.

American Indians

3. The Chickasaws, Arrell M. Gibson (1971). The old acknowledged masterwork on the subject. Gibson often cities interesting primary sources. Still, Richard D. Green, the current historian of the Chickasaw Nation, notes that Gibson produced this book without interviewing a single Chickasaw. Since then, of course, a newer day in the historiography of American Indians has dawned.

4. American Indians in U.S. History, by Roger L. Nichols (2003). An engaging, brief survey by an expert. Longer and, in my opinion, more useful than the introduction by Perdue and Green (see next entry). Like them, Nichols takes a chronological approach. His text is not accompanied by reference notes, but each chapter ends with a brief list of “Suggested Readings” that represent the classic titles for that historical period.

5. North American Indians: A Very Short Introduction, by Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green (2010). More serviceable than most of the other volumes in the Very Short Introductions series that I’ve read. Chapter 4, “Indians in the West,” corresponds closely to Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier, 1846-1890, listed below.

6. The Indian Frontier, 1846-1890, by Robert M. Utley (2003). An interesting survey. The author essentially says, “For the moment, let’s hold onto the Frederick Jackson Turner thesis, but include Indians along that all-important frontier.” Just after I finished reading Utley, I posted a full summary of his book.

Mostly Just for Fun

7. Van Halen Rising: How a Southern California Backyard Party Band Saved Heavy Metal, by Greg Renoff (2015). Renoff begins with the early lives of the original members of Van Halen, and ends with the 11-month world tour that followed the release of their first album in 1978. The book is mostly about Van Halen before hardly anyone outside of Southern California knew who they were. I read it just after passing my qualifying exams, which made the experience that much better. Anyway, if you're interested here's a bit more about it.

8. Ford County: Stories, by John Grisham (2009). This book is Grisham's only published collection of short stories. Not many people like short stories anymore. I've always liked them. With novels, you sometimes don't know if you're going to like them until you're several pages in. With a short story, by that point you're done, and you know not to necessarily trust that author. For one thing, Grisham tends to write long short stories. I know, that's a weird description. But for comparison, check out one of the really-short short stories by Raymond Carver.

9. Bound for Glory, by Woody Guthrie (1943). Woody Guthrie's unique and colorful descriptions of early-twentieth century America will sometimes make you smile and laugh. At other times, his recollections of personal struggles--a family ravaged by disease, financial disaster, house fires, and destitution--might just make you cry. Through it all, you will admire and appreciate Guthrie's unbreakable spirit. Here we have on full display the mind and heart of a creative genius who never took himself too seriously.

Restoration Movement History

10. Among the Early Evangelicals: The Transatlantic Origins of the Stone-Campbell Movement, by James L. Gorman (2017). This is the most significant monograph dealing with the Stone-Campbell Restoration Movement to be published in the last several years. In this revision of his doctoral dissertation, Gorman reveals the transatlantic, pre-American roots of the Campbell Movement in America. A signal achievement, Gorman's work breaks new ground and resets the agenda for studying "Campbellism" in America.

11. The Sun Will Shine Again, Someday: A History of the Non-Class, One Cup Churches of Christ, by Ronny F. Wade (1986). The subtitle says it all: “A History of the Non-Class, One Cup Churches of Christ.” The author, Ronny F. Wade, is a long-time, widely-regarded preacher within this group. As one might expect, the history he writes is characterized by advocacy. He is much like the sports announcer who, while calling the game, always cheers for his team. Sometime back, I posted a brief review of Wade's book.

12. Oklahoma Christians: A History of Christian Churches and of the Start of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Oklahoma, by Stephen J. England (1975). England was a great biblical scholar, teacher, and leader within the Disciples denomination during the 20th century. Because he spent so much of his career serving as a professor and school administrator in Oklahoma, he took an interest in the history of his people in the Sooner State. For that particular topic, this book is a unique resource.

Still Other Sorts of History

13. Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America, by David Hackett Fischer (1989). The pick of the litter. This book, all by itself, is an education in several broad streams of American history. Fischer is one of those force-of-nature historians, and Albion's Seed is a delightful masterpiece. You'll never think of the various regions of the U.S. the same way after reading it.

14. Contesting the Reformation, by C. Scott Dixon (2012). Dixon has done a great service to students of the Protestant Reformation. A true expert on the literature, he writes each chapter as a detailed historiographical essay on some aspect of this massive topic. I found it to be an indispensable resource, especially as I prepared for qualifying exams on the Reformation! So, if you're getting ready for exams, or you just want to get a handle on the secondary literature about, say, Calvinism or the Radical Reformation, Dixon's book should be your first stop. It is both thorough and detailed. At least in English, there's nothing else quite like it.

15. Heading South to Teach: The World of Susan Nye Hutchison, 1815-1845, by Kim Tolley (2015). An outstanding new example of microhistory American style. By closely examining the life of an ordinary woman who did extraordinary things, Tolley is able to identify something of how the early U.S. changed especially as a result of the Second Great Awakening.

Texas History

16. Gone To Texas: A History of the Lone Star State, by Randolph B. Campbell (2003). This is likely the very best general survey of Texas history. Campbell relates the story of Texas "from prehistoric times to the beginning of the twenty-first century" (ix). The book is easy-reading, and is complemented by dozens of maps and illustrations. The history of the Lone Star State has often been told according to the traditional, great-people-and-events model. Some readers, especially Texans, might argue that given the topic, this approach is only natural. Either way, Campbell's book is no exception to the rule. Immigration, politics, and conflict, often violent conflict, are major features of the coverage. Neither footnotes nor endnotes accompany the text. Instead, each chapter has its own selected bibliography.

17. Sleuthing the Alamo: Davy Crockett's Last Stand and Other Mysteries of the Texas Revolution, by James E. Crisp (2005). In this delightful, unusual little book, a native Texan combines memoir and original research as he takes up two specific questions about the Texas Revolution. First, was Sam Houston, a president of the Republic of Texas, an anti-Mexican racist? Or, did someone else put words in his mouth? Second, did Davy Crockett really go down fighting at the Alamo, or did he surrender to Santa Anna's troops? Along the way, Crisp uncovers long-lost evidence, detects mistranslations, reveals secrets, and teaches the reader some of the deeper significance of history. He concludes that when, for whatever reason, we attempt to bury and silence the past we just wind up diminishing ourselves.

24: The LBJ Edition

Steven M. Gillon, The Kennedy Assassination--24 Hours Later: Lyndon B. Johnson's Pivotal First Day as President. New York: Basic Books, 2009. pp. xvii + 294.

Maybe you suspect that history is boring. Or, maybe you know that it's important and interesting, but it just seems like books take all the fun out of it. If any of that sounds familiar, then this book is for you.

The author, Steven M. Gillon is a fantastic researcher and a good writer, too. His topic is absolutely fascinating, and he's looked at tons of documents only recently declassified.

Most books about the Kennedy assassination deal with questions like: Who shot JFK? Was there more than one gunman? Was the assassination the result of a conspiracy? On and on it goes. Gillon's book is different. The author assumes that the Warren Commission got it right. There was one gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald. And even though Oswald would have loved more attention from the Soviet Union and from Cuban authorities, he did what he did on his own.

Instead of dealing with those questions for the ten thousandth time, Gillon investigates what the new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, experienced and what he did during the 24 hours after the assassination. Gillon reveals an LBJ who tried to do several things all at once:

• He tried to assure the American people that the devastating assassination of their president had not destroyed their government. For example, Johnson invited photographers to capture those moments that revealed continuity, as when he took the oath of office aboard Air Force One.
• He did his best to show deference to the people who were closest to the slain president, especially to his widow, Jackie Kennedy. Johnson told Mrs. Kennedy that there was no need for her to quickly vacate the White House. He reportedly said to her, "You stay as long as you want."
• He sought to connect his brand new presidency to the legacy of John Kennedy, and worked to consolidate his authority as the head of the executive branch of the U.S. government. During the first 24 following the assassination, Johnson repeatedly told White House staffers that he wanted them to stay on the job, and that he needed them more than they needed him.

Two of Gillon's main themes are Johnson's personal insecurities and the real disdain that many people who were closest to JFK felt for him. Above all, the dead president's brother and closest confidant, Robert F. Kennedy, hated Johnson.

The book comes packaged in seventeen short chapters, which makes it easy to take in one chapter at a time. It includes 14 black-and-white photos, 30 pages of endnotes, a brief "Note on Sources," and a good index.

Here's a C-SPAN video of Gillon talking about his book not long after it was published. Here is the New Books Network podcast interview with Gillon.

The Kennedy Imprisonment, by Garry Wills

Wills, Garry. The Kennedy Imprisonment: A Meditation on Power (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982).

Wills, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and historian, wrote this book in the wake of Senator Ted Kennedy’s unsuccessful run in 1980 for the Democratic presidential nomination. Like a political observer trained in family psychology, the author attempts to explain the unique privileges, burdens--and now failures-- of the youngest Kennedy son.

He describes it all as the result of the family’s development and abuse of power over many decades. For example, in “Part One: Sex,” Wills tells a number of stories about the philandering father, Joe Kennedy Sr. He suggests that John Kennedy, also a compulsive womanizer, was both acting like his father and trying to compensate for his own weak constitution. Only years later would the moral weight of this “masculine” family habit fall squarely on Ted’s shoulders. His lonely and damaged wife, Joan, and the candidate’s obvious reluctance to come close to any woman in public were just two of the pitiful consequences of a pattern of immorality spanning two generations.

In subsequent parts, Wills likewise depicts Ted as the prisoner of “Family” and “Image,” and “Charisma.” To devastating effect, he describes a Joe Kennedy Sr. obsessed with the goal of portraying his children, especially his sons, as a group of indomitable winners. For example, working behind the scenes Joe began with John’s senior paper at Harvard and managed to have it padded, reworked, and promoted as a noteworthy book, Why England Slept. He also saw to it that the story of PT 109 was carefully crafted and publicized so that John emerged as one of the best-known heroes of World War II. Again, the apple didn’t fall far from the tree. Years later it was not John Kennedy, but Ted Sorensen assisted by Jules Davids, who wrote almost all of Profiles in Courage, a book that, incredibly, garnered for JFK a Pulitzer Prize. Of course, the decades-long tradition of deception and empty credentials would inevitably come crashing down. But again, in this tragedy of Shakespearean proportions the older Kennedys experienced the pride. It was Ted, in so many ways alone, who would know the fall.

In the last major section of the book, “Power,” Wills sets out to demolish, among other things, the American myth of the Cuban missile crisis. One by one, he takes out each pillar holding up the structure: Notwithstanding the attempts to spread the blame, only President Kennedy could have launched or prevented the Bay of Pigs. With a mixture of hubris and ignorance, he opted to go with the plan, in part because it was clandestine, unconventional, and high brow, “a James Bond exploit blessed by Yale, a PT raid run by Ph.D.s” (231). And why not risk it? The president had been so lucky up till then.

The early, conventional portraits of the Kennedy administration suggest that not only did JFK learn several important lessons from his humiliating defeat, it was this newfound wisdom that supposedly enabled him to act so effectively during the missile crisis. But Wills insists that the facts speak otherwise. He says that after the Bay of Pigs, the president never questioned the general purpose and plan of the scheme. To the contrary, he increased his dedication to an anti-bureaucratic approach that specialized in things like paramilitary assaults, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla warfare. In other words, after the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy did not change his course. Instead, he became more devoted to the prospect of unseating Fidel Castro, this time by means of the secretive Operation Mongoose. Plans designed to topple the Cuban dictator were well known by both Castro and Khrushchev. Thus, the reason why Castro reluctantly agreed to have Soviet missiles sent to Cuba was because he wanted a deterrent against an invasion by the US. When Cuba and the USSR made this claim during the crisis, they were telling the truth.

And what of the legendary restraint shown by Kennedy during the crisis? Wills answers that the president’s claim that he made “every effort” in order to provide room for his adversary is “demonstrably untrue” (265). Among other things, Kennedy ruled out open diplomacy from the very beginning of the crisis, insisted that the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey must not be seen as a quid pro quo, and eventually gave the Russians a 24-hour deadline along with his proposal, a move that actually increased the likelihood of war.

Wills says that by acting in such unrestrained fashion, Kennedy helped to precipitate the fall of Khrushchev, a relatively-easy opponent who was replaced by a Soviet hard-liner. Having been treated this way once by the US, leaders in the USSR were in no mood to make compromises later. Not only that, Kennedy’s behavior in the crisis established a pattern of insisting that the US always deal with adversaries from a superior position, instead of as equals. For these reasons, Wills concludes that the Cuban missile crisis was not, in fact, a great victory for Kennedy and America.

The Kennedy Imprisonment was intended for a general, non-academic audience. It is extremely well written and reads easily. Nevertheless, any book making so many counter claims, several of them audacious, really should be accompanied by documentation. There was no good reason for this work to be published without some sort of notes. Their absence significantly weakens the credibility and usefulness of what might have been a convincing, as well as telling, critique.

The Week the World Stood Still

Stern, Sheldon M. The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.


From 1977 to 1999, Sheldon M. Stern served as Historian of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. In 2003, Stern published Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press). The author describes that book as a “full-length” account based primarily on tape recordings of meetings that were held in the Cabinet Room and Oval Office of the White House during the crisis. Two years later, in 2005, Stern published The Week the World Stood Still, the book under review. In his “Acknowledgments,” he explains that this later work is a “revised and condensed version of Averting ‘The Final Failure’,” designed especially for “students and general readers.”

In Chapter One, “The JFK Cuban Missile Crisis Tapes,” Stern describes both the delight and the frustration of listening to the recordings of the meetings. He relates the tedium of using the tapes, often incomplete and sometimes poor in quality, in order to identify who was speaking and what each person said. He also tells some of the story behind the production of the tapes: of JFK’s request for a recording system in the White House, the system itself and how it worked, etc. Finally, he disputes the notion that because only President Kennedy and his brother Robert knew that they were being recorded, the tapes fail to capture honest dialogue, but instead record the Kennedys posturing for posterity. In defense of his assertion, the author notes that a freewheeling conversation among fifteen bright people would be impossible to manipulate. Besides, like Richard M. Nixon a decade later, President Kennedy never imagined that anyone else would ever have access to his tapes. Above all, Stern reminds the reader that at the time of the crisis, as the meetings were being recorded, no one knew for sure how it would all turn out.

In Chapter Two, “The Making of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” the author sets the stage with a short, well-written, and helpful overview of the historical realities leading up to the crisis. Stern describes the Cold War and U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and with Cuba. He also tells us, with remarkable insight, about John F. Kennedy. Stern quotes letters written by JFK when he was a junior naval officer serving in the Pacific during World War II. Here, the reader gets to listen in as the unsuspecting future President candidly talks about the unspeakable ugliness of war and the comic ineptness of at least some military leaders. Stern closes the chapter with something that I found especially helpful: a brief, professional biography of each of the “Key Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.”

Chapter Three, “The Secret Meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council,” makes up more than three-quarters of the book. Here Stern recounts the significant events and meetings of each day of the Cuban Missile Crisis, beginning with Tuesday, October 16, 1962, and continuing through Monday, October 29. Throughout, the author weaves together description and direct quotation in order to produce a continuous narrative. Without hearing the tapes themselves, the reader gains a strong sense of how the meetings went, the personalities involved, the attitudes of the participants, who spoke most frequently, and the specific decisions that President Kennedy had to make while under incredible pressure.

Stern’s account provides plenty of high drama. A good example comes from JFK’s meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday morning, October19. A few days into the crisis by this point, the deliberations of the Executive Committee had convinced the president of the terrible hazards and possibly-tragic consequences of a full-scale attack and invasion of Cuba. Kennedy favored something less drastic, a naval blockade of Cuba. But the JCS stoutly opposed him:

General LeMay, giving no indication that he had understood the dangers raised by the president, turned JFK’s Berlin argument on its head: “I don’t share your view that if we knock off Cuba they’re gonna knock off Berlin.” The Soviets “are gonna push on Berlin and push real hard” if the U.S. fails to take military action against Cuba, since they would feel “they’ve got us on the run.” Kennedy interrupted to ask about Soviet reprisals after a U.S. attack on Cuba. There would be no reprisals, LeMay asserted confidently, as long as you tell Khrushchev again, “If they make a move [in Berlin], we’re gonna fight.” The self-assured general moved in for the verbal kill: “This blockade and political action I see leading into war. . . . This is almost as bad as the appeasement in Munich. . . . I just don’t see any other solution except direct military intervention, right now” (pp. 67-68).
Passages like that one typify Stern’s account. From beginning to end, the reader is able to perceive the emotional ebb and flow of the meetings, as well as the political, military, and diplomatic questions that the president had to answer. The chapter ends not long after Nikita Khrushchev made his surprise announcement, on Saturday, October 27, that the Soviets would dismantle and remove their offensive weapons from Cuba.

“Epilogue: The November Post-Crisis” describes the tentative character of the agreement that the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. had reached. There were still many loose ends to tie up.

In his “Conclusion,” Stern reflects on the ways in which his experience with the tapes radically changed his perspective on the president and the crisis. Like most everyone else during the late 1960s, Stern says that he took it for granted “that John Kennedy had been a tough and relentless Cold Warrior.” However, in spite of his hard public rhetoric and his desire to see Castro eliminated, during the crisis Kennedy "repeatedly acted to prevent, postpone, or at least question the wisdom of” more than a dozen “potentially provocative measures” (216). In doing so, he “often stood virtually alone against warlike counsel from the ExComm, the JCS, and the leaders of Congress during those historic 13 days” (217). It seems clear that the author continues to esteem John F. Kennedy as a hero. Only now, he has different reasons.

Bobby Kennedy on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Introductions by Robert S. McNamara and Harold Macmillan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969.

At the beginning of Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy relates something of what it felt like when he and his brother, President John F. Kennedy, and several other high officials of the U.S. government first heard the facts. On Tuesday, October 16, 1962, experts from the U.S. Intelligence Community revealed to the group that the Soviet Union was building a missile base on the island of Cuba, and that atomic weapons and large missiles were already there. During the weeks leading up to that meeting, Soviet representatives, including Chairman Nikita Khrushchev himself, had consistently assured American leaders that they had no intention of sending surface-to-surface missiles or offensive weapons to Cuba. Remembering the moment when the truth became clear, Kennedy writes: "Now, as the representatives of the CIA explained the U-2 photographs that morning, . . . we realized that it had all been lies, one gigantic fabric of lies." There at page 27, I was hooked and kept reading to the end. What a riveting story, told so well.

From there, Kennedy describes some of the initial deliberations of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (the "Ex Comm"). He tells about the competing recommendations they offered, which invariably led to the excruciating decisions that finally only the President could make. The first major decision took up the question of an appropriate initial response. After President Kennedy rejected the plan of a military strike and adopted the idea of naval blockade of Cuba, there were other questions to answer. Many of these were related to the task of striking a balance. On the one hand, it was imperative that the U.S. forcefully confront Khrushshev over the treachery and provocation of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it was also necessary to leave room so that the Chairman could retain honor and respectability while backing down. As Kennedy describes it, this balancing act was performed by the President as he stood between the implicit threats from the Soviets on one side, and calls from U.S. military leaders and hawkish members of Congress for at least a strike, or even a full invasion of Cuba, on the other side.

Kennedy relates a number of nail-biting episodes as the crisis unfolded. He tells, for example, about the President meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko two days after U.S. officials became aware of the build up, and how Gromyko denied any such activity. He also reports how, at his brother's request, he made a visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin who, like Gromyko, held to the same official line: no long-range missiles had been delivered to Cuba, and the Soviet government had no intention of doing any such thing. Kennedy gives the reader a good sense of what it was like for the President to hear from the Ex-Comm about every possible contingency before making day-to-day and sometimes minute-to-minute decisions that brought with them huge consequences. Finally, Kennedy relates the official agreement according to which the Soviet Union would remove their weapons systems from Cuba and the United States would end the quarantine and pledge not to invade the island nation.

In addition to a sense of relief, I had several reactions as I finished this book. First, I was impressed at how well it is written. Throughout, Kennedy exhibits a crisp, easy-to-read style, the eloquence of precise and clear language.

Second, I was struck by the consistent humanity of this unique story. For example, if they go on long enough, even the most grave circumstances get interrupted by humor and the ridiculous. The Cuban Missile Crisis was no exception. Kennedy relates some of this. For example, upon realizing that something would have to be done in response to the aggression and deceit of the Soviets, Robert passed a note to his brother saying, "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor" (31). And I had to smile when reading the story of how, instead of traveling in a long line of limousines which would have tipped off the press, ten men crammed into Kennedy's car for a ride to the White House (43).

Third, I felt suspicious whenever I sensed that Kennedy's own presidential aspirations and his natural desire to preserve his brothers' dignity overwhelmed the narrative. For example, he chalks up the Bay of Pigs debacle to a failure to solicit a variety of competing opinions. That action was precipitated by a unanimity of thought, says Kennedy, which closed off the possibility of a better decision (112). It also seemed more than a coincidence that Kennedy never mentions his official title, U.S. Attorney General. From beginning to end, he casts himself primarily as the President's brother, close advisor and assistant. An uniformed reader might be forgiven for concluding that Robert was the Vice President, instead of Lyndon Johnson to whom the author grants nothing more than a cameo appearance.

Most of all, I was glad I had read this book. In it, Robert Kennedy accomplished exactly what he set out to do: to tell the incredible story of the Cuban Missile Crisis from his own singular perspective.